IN RE: PETITION FOR G.R. No. 149615
SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
ELENA
Petitioner, Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr.,
and
Chico-Nazario,
JJ.
HELMUT MULLER,
Respondent. Promulgated:
August 29, 2006
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YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
This
petition for review on certiorari[1]
assails the February 26, 2001 Decision[2] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 affirming with modification the
August 12, 1996 Decision[3] of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No.
Q-94-21862, which terminated the regime of absolute community of property
between petitioner and respondent, as well as the Resolution[4]
dated
The
facts are as follows:
Petitioner
Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in
Due
to incompatibilities and respondent’s alleged womanizing, drinking, and
maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. On
On
However,
pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous
title by either spouse during the marriage shall be excluded from the community
property. The real property, therefore,
inherited by petitioner in
x x
x x
As
regards the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 of the
Registry of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila, situated in Antipolo, Rizal and
the improvements thereon, the Court shall not make any pronouncement on
constitutional grounds.[7]
Respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals which rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial court’s
Decision. It held that respondent merely
prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not
acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also considered petitioner’s ownership over
the property in trust for the respondent.
As regards the house, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in
the Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same. The dispositive portion of the assailed
decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the lower court dated
SO
ORDERED.[8]
Hence, the instant petition for
review raising the following issues:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HEREIN IS ENTITLED TO
REIMBURSEMENT OF THE AMOUNT USED TO PURCHASE THE LAND AS WELL AS THE COSTS FOR
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE, FOR IN SO RULING, IT INDIRECTLY ALLOWED AN ACT
DONE WHICH OTHERWISE COULD NOT BE DIRECTLY x x x DONE, WITHOUT DOING VIOLENCE
TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION THAT AN ALIEN IS PROHIBITED FROM ACQUIRING
OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTIES LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT’S CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH IS ACTUALLY A
DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN OWNERSHIP OVER THE
Petitioner contends that respondent,
being an alien, is disqualified to own private lands in the
Respondent claims that he is not
praying for transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property but merely
reimbursement; that the funds paid by him for the said property were in
consideration of his marriage to petitioner; that the funds were given to
petitioner in trust; and that equity demands that respondent should be
reimbursed of his personal funds.
The issue for resolution is whether
respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition
of the Antipolo property.
The petition has merit.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution states:
Save
in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or
corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from
acquiring private lands.[9] The primary purpose of the constitutional
provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. In the case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,[10] the Court held:
Under
section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, “natural resources, with the exception
of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated,” and with respect to
public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens.
But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands
of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves
who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to
prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as
follows:
“Sec.
5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
This
constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which
agricultural resources may leak into aliens’ hands. It would certainly be
futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if,
after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private
agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. x x x
x x
x x
If
the term “private agricultural lands” is to be construed as not including
residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that “aliens
may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for
themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities,” and that “they
may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes,
factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and
vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of
other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant’s words, strictly
agricultural.” (Solicitor General’s Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the
conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.
Respondent was aware of the
constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this
Court.[11] He declared that he had the Antipolo property
titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition.[12] His attempt at subsequently asserting or
claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding
that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view of
petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Save
for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondent’s
disqualification from owning lands in the
Invoking the principle that a court
is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will
follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of
public policy, cannot be done directly.[14] He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands.
The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the
principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied
relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the
controversy in issue.[15]
Thus, in the instant case, respondent
cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he
willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional
prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between
transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondent’s
part. To allow reimbursement would in
effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not
allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise
proscribed by law. As expressly held in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court:[16]
Finally,
the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution ordains that, “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.” Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course,
charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his
intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he
acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in
attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and
clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was
null and void. In any event, he had and
has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same
property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the
prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory
would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the
property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a
not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a
decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.
As
already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase
the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed
and overturned. But even if it were a
fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the
considerations just set out to militate, on high constitutional grounds,
against his recovering and holding the property so acquired, or any part
thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share
of the money used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition
or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in
the premises, a purely academic exercise. (Emphasis added)
WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
February 26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 ordering
petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller to reimburse respondent Helmut Muller the
amount of P528,000 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000
for the construction of the house in Antipolo City, and the Resolution dated
August 13, 2001 denying reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862 terminating
the regime of absolute community between the petitioner and respondent,
decreeing a separation of property between them and ordering the partition of
the personal properties located in the
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 31-50.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nos. 113472-73, December 20, 1994, 239 SCRA 341, 346.
[10] 79
Phil. 461, 473, 476 (1947).
[11] Rollo, p. 114.
[12]
TSN,
[13] Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
117228,
[14] Frenzel v. Catito, 453 Phil. 885, 905 (2003).
[15] University of the
[16]
G.R. No. 74833,